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place health plans that combined a compara-
tively low premium with a more restricted 
choice of providers.
Limited network plans might offer value to 
consumers. Coverage that pairs a low premi-
um with a network that provides meaningful 
access to health care might meet the needs of 
many enrollees, no matter the network’s over-
all size. Negotiations between insurers and 
providers over network participation might 
encourage more efficient delivery of care. 
And the power to contract selectively might al-
low insurers to create networks comprising a 
subset of providers who meet raised standards 
of quality, potentially resulting in higher- 
value care.
But these plans also pose risks. A network 
can be too narrow, jeopardizing the ability 
of consumers to obtain needed services in a 
timely manner. This can happen if the net-
work contains an inadequate mix of provider 
types. For example, a recent examination by 
Harvard researchers of the network compo-
sition of health plans offered on the federal 
Marketplace during 2015 found that nearly 
15 percent of the sampled plans lacked in- 
network physicians for at least one specialty. 
Or a network might have an insufficient num-
ber of providers: There might be too few phy-
sicians who are taking new patients, who are 
available for an appointment within a reason-
able time, or who speak the same language as 
the enrollee. Certain network limitations also 
what’s the issue?
Health insurance plans with limited networks 
of providers are common on the Affordable 
Care Act’s (ACA’s) health insurance Market-
places. Recent studies have found that these 
“narrow network” plans constituted nearly 
half of all Marketplace offerings in the first 
two years of coverage, with one analysis con-
cluding that about 90 percent of all consum-
ers had the option of buying such a plan if 
they chose.
Plans with limited networks are not new 
and are not confined to the Marketplaces. Yet 
there is reason to believe that they have grown 
in prevalence partly because of the ACA. Many 
of the health law’s consumer protections—
prohibitions on health status underwriting, 
increased standardization of benefits, a maxi-
mum limit on out-of-pocket spending, and the 
elimination of annual and lifetime limits on 
benefits, for example—have foreclosed tra-
ditional strategies used by insurers to keep 
costs in check. Meanwhile, other elements of 
reform, including online Marketplaces that 
make it easier for consumers to compare plans 
based on premiums and a financial assistance 
framework that links the amount of a person’s 
premium tax credit to the cost of the second 
cheapest plan available to them at the silver 
metal tier, explicitly encourage insurers to 
compete on price. These developments appear 
to have led many insurers to design Market-
Regulation of Health Plan Provider Networks. 
Narrow networks have changed considerably 
under the Affordable Care Act, but the 
trajectory of regulation remains unclear.
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might have the effect of discouraging enroll-
ment by sicker consumers, potentially skew-
ing the risk pool. Plans that provide limited 
or inadequate access to in-network providers 
make it more likely that enrollees will obtain 
care from out-of-network sources, exposing 
them to significant expenses and the possibil-
ity of surprise medical bills.
Surveys show that many consumers are 
open to trading network breadth for a lower 
premium. They also suggest that, in practice, 
large numbers of consumers do not find net-
work designs to be transparent. If the features 
of a plan’s network are inadequately explained 
or its list of participating providers is inac-
curate, it might be impossible for consumers 
to make an informed decision about whether 
the plan’s combination of network and price 
is right for them.
Consumers’ experiences with narrow net-
work plans since the ACA’s implementation 
have defied easy characterization. Surveys 
of the insured, including those with Market-
place coverage, suggest that the vast majority 
are satisfied with their plan’s choice of doc-
tors. Yet anecdotal complaints about networks 
have proliferated, and the exclusion by some 
health plans of high-profile hospitals and care 
facilities has generated media headlines.
In light of these developments, and as part 
of a larger effort to keep pace with changes to 
the health insurance markets since passage 
of the ACA, lawmakers and regulators have 
devoted significant attention to determin-
ing how networks should be regulated to en-
sure they are adequate and transparent. This 
work has involved efforts to establish or up-
date standards for evaluating the sufficiency 
of a plan’s network, improve the accuracy of 
provider directories, and protect enrollees 
from surprise bills from out-of-network pro-
viders. This brief offers an overview of state 
and federal actions that address the first two 
categories—network standards and provider 
directories—with a focus on rules that gov-
ern plans sold on the ACA’s health insurance 
Marketplaces.
what’s the background?
Network basics
One way that many health plans seek to con-
trol costs is by creating a provider network. 
Plans contract with doctors, hospitals, and 
other medical professionals who, in exchange 
for their participation within the network 
and an expectation of greater patient volume, 
agree to deliver care to the plan’s enrollees at 
negotiated rates. This ability to contract selec-
tively—and exclude, or threaten to exclude, a 
high-cost provider—gives insurers leverage to 
bargain for lower health care prices and can 
help moderate premiums.
For consumers, network design can be criti-
cal (see Exhibit 1). Enrollees typically receive 
a more generous insurance benefit if they visit 
in-network providers: Cost sharing is usually 
markedly lower than for out-of-network care, 
and most in-network charges are subject to 
an ACA-established overall annual limit on 
out-of-pocket spending. Meanwhile, some 
network plans might not cover any nonemer-
gency care costs if a consumer obtains ser-
vices from a nonparticipating provider. Even 
if a plan does offer an out-of-network benefit, 
enrollees who receive care outside their net-
work might be billed by the provider for the 
difference between the plan’s payment and the 
provider’s charge—a practice known as “bal-
ance billing.”
Network plans vary not only in their de-
sign but also in their breadth. Studies by the 
McKinsey and Company consulting firm 
found that, in 2015, about 22 percent of Mar-
ketplace plan networks were narrow—defined 
as having between 30 percent and 70 percent 
of area hospitals in-network—while 17 percent 
were “ultra-narrow,” with hospital participa-
tion rates below 30 percent. Researchers at 
the University of Pennsylvania likewise have 
observed significant variation in Marketplace 
network breadth in terms of physician par-
ticipation; for example, about 41 percent of 
2014 plans had small or very small networks, 
with fewer than a quarter of area physicians 
participating. 
These findings have also suggested that 
the link between a plan’s network design and 
size has eroded over time. Knowing a plan’s 
type—whether it is a health maintenance or-
ganization (HMO) or a preferred provider 
organization (PPO), for example—can shed 
important light on its benefit structure for 
out-of-network care but is of increasingly lim-
ited use in understanding how big or small the 
plan’s network might be.
State regulation of network adequacy for com-
mercial health plans, pre-ACA
Regulation of private health insurance tra-
ditionally has been a state responsibility. In 
an effort to ensure that health plans can de-
22% 
In 2015 about 22 percent of 
Marketplace plan networks  
were narrow—defined as  
having between 30 percent  
and 70 percent of area hospitals 
in-network.
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liver on the insurance benefits they promise, 
most states have long had in place rules gov-
erning plan networks. However, the content 
and scope of these requirements have varied 
substantially. 
Historically, most states first established 
network rules for HMOs. Over time, as insur-
ers’ network designs changed, some, but not 
all, states modified their regulatory regimes 
to encompass other plan types—mainly PPOs. 
Sometimes, a state’s network regulations were 
crafted to treat PPOs and HMOs similarly. But 
often, given differences in their network de-
sign, rules developed somewhat differently 
across products or have been administered by 
different regulatory bodies. (In some states, 
for example, the department of insurance 
regulates PPOs, while the state’s health agency 
oversees HMOs.) 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, state efforts to en-
sure compliance with network standards also 
differ among the states in process and sub-
stance. In many states, regulators have con-
ducted network adequacy reviews only when 
an insurer initially seeks licensure, upon 
notice of a significant change in a plan’s net-
work, or in response to complaints. Ongoing 
oversight has been much less common.
Qualitative standards
By 2014, the year when Marketplace cov-
erage started, nearly every state had on the 
books a flexible, qualitative standard obli-
gating HMOs, PPOs, or, in some cases, all 
managed care plans, to maintain an adequate 
network. For example, Kansas requires man-
aged care plans to have a “sufficient” mix of 
in-network providers so enrollees can access 
all covered services “without unreasonable 
delay.” As is common in other states, insurers 
in Kansas might demonstrate compliance with 
this standard by showing that they adhere to 
“any reasonable criteria” the insurer might se-
lect, including, but not limited to, quantitative 
measures of network sufficiency.
Quantitative standards
A little more than half of states supplement-
ed their subjective standard with an objec-
tive one, requiring plans to meet at least one 
quantitative test of network adequacy. Most 
frequently, states specified the maximum 
amount of time and distance an enrollee can 
be asked to travel to access covered services. 
Standards typically identified the type or 
types of providers to which plans must pre-
serve access. Requirements around primary 
care providers were most common, although 
exhibit 1
Types of network plans and pricing designs 
source Author’s analysis.
Type of plan Description
Health maintenance 
organization
(HMO)
An HMO plan provides coverage for health care services received from providers directly employed by the plan or 
contracted with it. HMO plans generally require enrollees to select a primary care physician who manages their care 
and serves as a gatekeeper for other health services: Enrollees must obtain a referral from their primary care physician 
before receiving care from another in-network provider. An HMO plan typically does not cover any costs associated with 
services obtained outside of its network.
Point-of-service  
(POS) plan 
A POS plan is similar to an HMO in that an enrollee is typically required to designate a primary care physician and obtain a 
referral prior to receiving care from a network specialist. Unlike an HMO plan, a POS plan provides benefits for services 
received out-of-network, although usually with higher cost sharing. 
Exclusive provider 
organization
(EPO)
An EPO plan provides coverage through a network of contracted providers. An EPO plan allows enrollees greater flex-
ibility to visit in-network providers than do HMO plans: EPO plans do not require designation of a primary care physician 
or referrals to specialists. But, like an HMO, an EPO plan does not provide any coverage for care received out-of-network.
Preferred provider 
organization
(PPO)
A PPO plan provides coverage through a network of contracted providers. PPO plans generally provide enrollees the 
greatest level of flexibility to visit a desired provider. Plans do not require designation of a primary care physician or 
referrals to specialists, and they do include coverage for care received outside of the network, although usually with 
higher cost sharing.
Tiered network Some network plans use a tiered design. Tiered networks subdivide in-network providers based on factors that include 
cost or quality. Enrollees pay lower cost sharing when they obtain care from providers in the preferred tier and higher 
cost sharing when they obtain care from providers in less-preferred tiers.
Reference pricing Some network plans employ a reference pricing design. Such plans agree to pay a fixed amount—the reference price—
for a particular procedure, which certain providers accept as payment in full. Enrollees who obtain care from a provider 
who does not accept the reference price generally must pay the difference between the reference price and the pro-
vider’s contracted rate.
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some states enumerated travel limits for 
health care facilities and specialists. For ex-
ample, New Jersey requires its managed care 
plans, including HMOs, to have available at 
least two primary care physicians within ten 
miles or thirty minutes driving or public tran-
sit time of 90 percent of their enrollees. The 
state also requires plans to provide access to 
various specialized services, including, for 
example, hospitals providing perinatal and 
tertiary pediatric services, within specified 
time and distance limits.
Sometimes, states created time and distance 
requirements that vary depending on popu-
lation density or geography. In New Mexico, 
for example, plans serving areas with 50,000 
or more residents must ensure that two con-
tracted primary care physicians are within 
twenty minutes or twenty miles of 90 percent 
of the enrolled population; for plans serving 
more sparsely populated areas, the standard is 
relaxed to sixty minutes or sixty miles.
States adopted other quantitative stan-
dards, as well. Nearly a dozen states sought to 
assure timely access to care by imposing limits 
on how long enrollees can be made to wait for 
appointments for nonemergency services. For 
example, Montana requires certain network 
plans to ensure access to urgent care within 
twenty-four hours; nonurgent care with symp-
toms within ten days; immunizations within 
twenty-one days; and routine or preventive 
services within forty-five days. A similar num-
ber of states attempted to ensure networks 
contained a sufficient number of providers by 
requiring plans to meet ratios of providers to 
enrollees. Regulatory agencies in California, 
for example, require that all network plans 
have at least one full-time-equivalent primary 
care physician for every 2,000 enrollees. 
Network transparency
Consumers rely on provider directories to 
find out which providers are in a plan’s net-
work and to learn other basic information 
about them, including office location, spe-
cialty, and whether they are accepting new 
patients. Most states regulated the content, 
distribution frequency, or format of these di-
rectories. Few, however, had specific regulato-
ry provisions designed to ensure that provider 
lists were kept current throughout the year. 
By 2014 fewer than a dozen states required 
insurers to update provider directories at 
least semi-annually or within a specified time 
frame of any change in network composition.
what’s the law today?
The ACA’s network adequacy provisions
With state regulation of network adequacy 
widespread but fragmented, the drafters of 
the ACA sought to establish a uniform base-
line standard that would apply to the health 
plans sold through the law’s new insurance 
Marketplaces. Section 1311(c) of the health 
law contains the first-ever federal network 
adequacy protections applicable to commer-
cial health insurance markets. The provisions 
require all qualified health plans available on 
the Marketplaces to maintain a “sufficient 
choice of providers” and “provide information 
to enrollees and prospective enrollees on the 
availability of in-network and out-of-network 
providers.” The law also requires qualified 
health plans to include within their networks 
“essential community providers”: those pro-
viders “that serve predominately low-income, 
medically-underserved individuals,” such as 
federally qualified health centers, family plan-
ning clinics, Indian health care providers, and 
Ryan White HIV/AIDS program providers.
Federal implementation of the ACA’s network 
requirements
Federal regulations and guidance further 
define the network standard contained in the 
health law. Much like the approach taken by 
many states, the federal framework is based 
on a flexible qualitative standard. Qualified 
health plans must maintain a network that is 
“sufficient in number and types of providers, 
including providers that specialize in mental 
health and substance abuse services, to assure 
that all services will be accessible without un-
reasonable delay.” Plans must also disclose 
their provider directories to the Marketplace 
for online publication and indicate those pro-
viders who are not accepting new patients.
With these requirements serving as a regu-
latory floor, the ACA gives states significant 
latitude to continue to address network issues. 
States can choose to exercise primary respon-
sibility for insurer oversight and compliance 
with the federal standard and retain authority 
to enforce additional state-specific network 
rules, so long as they do not conflict with feder-
al law. Thus, for example, states that use quan-
titative measures of network adequacy can 
apply those standards to qualified health plans 
just as they do for non-Marketplace plans.
“Surveys show 
many consumers 
are open to 
trading network 
breadth for a 
lower premium.”
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Since initial implementation, federal regu-
lators have gradually strengthened qualified 
health plan network requirements. The ap-
proach has evolved furthest in states with a 
federally facilitated Marketplace, where offi-
cials at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) are responsible for certifying 
qualified health plans for sale. In 2015 CMS 
began to evaluate plans seeking certification 
on the federally facilitated Marketplace us-
ing a “reasonable access” standard. As part 
of this analysis, CMS now requires insurers 
to submit detailed network provider data and 
gives close scrutiny to provider types—such 
as hospital systems, mental health providers, 
oncology providers, and primary care provid-
ers—that have historically raised network ad-
equacy concerns.
Federal officials initially proposed to mod-
ify their regulations to incorporate quantita-
tive standards into the qualified health plan 
certification process beginning in 2017. Under 
the proposal, CMS would rely on state reviews 
of plan networks in states that use a recog-
nized quantitative measure of adequacy, such 
as a time and distance standard or a provider-
to-enrollee ratio. In states that declined to use 
a quantitative standard, CMS would perform 
its own analysis using a federal default time 
and distance metric. This proposed regula-
tory change was ultimately tabled. Neverthe-
less, CMS has signaled through subregulatory 
guidance that it will use time and distance 
standards going forward, as part of its “rea-
sonable access” review for qualified health 
plans on the federally facilitated Marketplace. 
Early experiences also have led federal of-
ficials to adopt more stringent requirements 
for network transparency. Marketplace plans 
are now required to update their provider di-
rectories at least once each month; include 
additional information about their providers, 
including specialties and institutional affilia-
tions; and ensure that the general public can 
easily access these lists online without logging 
into or creating an account. In the coming 
year, CMS will implement a process to de-
fine the breadth of each federally facilitated 
Marketplace qualified health plan’s network, 
as compared to other qualified health plans 
available in the same geographic area and will 
display this information on HealthCare.gov. 
Federal officials have invoked the ACA’s pro-
visions to regulate emerging network designs, 
as well. In a series of guidance documents, 
regulators have sought to explain how the 
ACA’s cap on out-of-pocket spending, an im-
portant protection that limits what consum-
ers can be made to spend each year for most 
care received from network providers, applies 
to plans that use reference pricing or a “simi-
lar network design.” Officials have made clear 
that plans that merely set a reference price for 
a service, but do not use a reasonable method 
to ensure consumers have adequate access to 
quality providers who accept that price, have 
not established a network for purposes of fed-
eral law. Such plans therefore must count any 
amount paid by an enrollee in excess of the 
reference price toward the enrollee’s out-of-
pocket spending limit.
what’s the debate?
Limited provider networks: Value is in the eye of 
the beholder
For insurers, limited networks offer the op-
portunity to tamp down on costs. Flexibility 
to create these networks allows for a wider 
range of plan designs and a greater variety of 
coverage options for consumers. Moreover, 
to the extent insurers consider quality when 
forming their networks, the power to contract 
selectively—including stronger performing 
providers, excluding weaker ones—might en-
courage the delivery of high-value care.
For many providers, the narrowing of net-
works runs counter to a preference for fewer 
restrictions on consumers’ choice of provid-
ers. To the extent such designs give insurers 
greater leverage in rate negotiations, it might 
affect providers’ bottom lines. Many providers 
are also skeptical of the degree to which insur-
ers actually use networks to promote quality 
and their ability to capture provider perfor-
mance accurately.
For consumers, narrow network plans pres-
ent a critical trade-off. Some might value the 
premium savings associated with limited 
networks more than they do a broad choice 
of providers. Others might be willing to pay 
more in up-front premium costs for greater 
network flexibility or to secure access to a 
specific physician or care facility. In the first 
two years of Marketplace coverage, consum-
ers on both ends of this spectrum had options 
from which to choose: Analyses by McKinsey 
and Company concluded that the overwhelm-
ing majority of Marketplace shoppers had ac-
cess to both narrow and broad network plans 
and that the quality of such networks—judged 
in terms of hospital performance—was not 
meaningfully different. 
40% 
More than 40 percent of new 
enrollees in 2015 were unaware of 
their plan’s network configuration.
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At the same time, evidence indicates that 
consumers might not have had enough infor-
mation about their plan choices or knowledge 
about health insurance and network designs, 
more generally, to make an informed decision 
about what premium and network combina-
tion to select. Surveys by the Commonwealth 
Fund have shown that about 20–25 percent of 
Marketplace enrollees did not know that the 
plans they were picking among had different 
networks, while McKinsey and Company has 
found that more than 40 percent of new en-
rollees in 2015 were unaware of their plan’s 
network configuration. As noted earlier, en-
rollees’ satisfaction with their choice of pro-
viders has remained high, and hard numbers 
on consumer complaints have so far been dif-
ficult to come by; but persistent anecdotal re-
ports suggest that some consumers ended up 
in plans with networks that were narrower 
than they anticipated. 
How prescriptive should network adequacy stan-
dards be?  
As we have seen, officials tasked with regu-
lating network adequacy have followed two ba-
sic approaches. The first requires health plans 
to adhere to preestablished quantitative stan-
dards for network sufficiency, such as time 
and distance limits or provider-to-enrollee 
ratios. The second is more subjective, relying 
on a qualitative assessment of whether, for ex-
ample, a network is “sufficient” to provide ac-
cess to covered services “without unreasonable 
delay.” Numeric measures might play a role in 
the qualitative framework: As noted above, 
many states permit insurers to demonstrate 
compliance with adequacy standards through 
a self-assessment that might incorporate quan-
titative criteria. But in these cases, specific, 
regulator-defined requirements are absent.
Proponents of qualitative standards favor 
their flexibility. They argue that it is important 
for network standards to account for regional 
differences in market dynamics, geography, 
and population and provider density, and sug-
gest it can be challenging for regulators to craft 
static requirements that do this efficiently. 
They assert that rules that are too prescriptive 
might reduce insurers’ leverage to negotiate for 
lower reimbursement rates, potentially under-
mining cost containment efforts and jeopar-
dizing innovation in plan design.
Those supportive of quantitative stan-
dards are skeptical that a subjective review 
of adequacy, often based on insurers’ own 
assessments of their networks, can provide 
consumers meaningful assurance that their 
access to covered services is protected. They 
see value in measurement standards that are 
transparent to the public and applied consis-
tently across plans. Many also agree that these 
metrics can and often should vary across and 
within states to account for regional differ-
ences but do not see this as an insurmount-
able obstacle to their adoption and use. They 
observe that a number of states and—in the 
context of Medicare Advantage—the federal 
government have experience developing tai-
lored quantitative standards that serve as 
benchmarks for assessing network adequacy 
in diverse settings.
Compliance and enforcement
While the questions of whether and on what 
basis to establish quantifiable metrics for net-
work adequacy have absorbed significant at-
tention, these are, to some degree, threshold 
issues. However regulators and policy mak-
ers decide to resolve them, they still must 
consider other, equally important questions 
about how to apply and enforce their chosen 
framework. For example, what circumstances 
should trigger regulatory review of a plan’s 
network? What information will regulators 
use to assess compliance with applicable stan-
dards? And what role will the insurer play in 
facilitating an adequacy determination?  
Proactive oversight of network rules, what-
ever their content, can be a complex and 
resource-intensive process. It is partly for 
this reason that many states depend on self-
reporting by insurers or accreditation deter-
minations by outside organizations, and why 
fairly few states conduct regular reviews of 
plan networks after their initial creation.
State efforts to assess compliance on an 
ongoing basis instead have relied heavily on 
consumer complaints. A 2014 survey of state 
departments of insurance found complaint 
data was the primary tool used by regulators 
to monitor network adequacy, with consum-
er feedback “highly value[d]” and tracked, 
with varying degrees of detail, by almost all 
respondents. 
Most agree that an oversight approach 
should be attuned to consumers’ actual expe-
riences with their networks. Yet complaints, 
on their own, might be of limited utility in 
evaluating adequacy, given that many consum-
ers do not understand their right to complain 
and do not know who they should complain to. 
A recent Consumer Reports survey found that 
“All indications 
suggest plans 
with limited 
networks will 
persist on and 
off of the ACA’s 
Marketplaces.”
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87 percent of Americans were unaware of what 
agency or department in their state is tasked 
with handling health insurance complaints 
and that 83 percent have never complained to 
a government agency about any issue. 
As part of the yearly certification process 
for Marketplace health plans on the federally 
facilitated Marketplace, CMS has required in-
surers to submit progressively more network 
data to demonstrate they meet federal adequa-
cy requirements. Although this federal review 
remains focused on the certification stage, of-
ficials note they continue to monitor network 
sufficiency throughout the plan year.  
Recent policy making at the state level has 
also tended to emphasize oversight. In 2014 
at least half a dozen states acted to bolster the 
ability of regulators to monitor and enforce 
network standards. California, for example, 
enacted legislation that requires regulators 
to perform annual reviews of plans’ compli-
ance with state standards and to post their 
findings, including any waivers or alternative 
standards that regulators approved, online.
Network transparency
The value proposition of networks—partic-
ularly narrow ones—is in large part dependent 
on consumers understanding how they work. 
Thus, there is broad agreement, in principle, 
that network designs should be transparent 
and that provider directories must be accurate 
and up-to-date. Nevertheless, the reliability of 
directories has long been a problem, and until 
recently, little effort has gone into developing 
formal and consistent definitions of network 
breadth. 
Focus on these issues has increased, how-
ever. Consumer advocates have been vocal in 
calling for uniform standards for the content 
and format of directories and specific require-
ments regarding how frequently they must be 
updated. These proposals have found a recep-
tive audience among federal officials—who, as 
noted above, have tightened provider directo-
ry requirements for qualified health plans and 
have introduced a system for characterizing 
the network breadth of plans sold on the fed-
erally facilitated Marketplace—and the states, 
approximately a dozen of which have strength-
ened their disclosure rules since 2014.
As with other aspects of network adequacy 
regulation, much of the debate about direc-
tories concerns mechanisms for securing 
compliance with standards and ramifications 
when errors occur. Insurers argue that plans 
and providers have a shared responsibility 
for ensuring that directories are accurate and 
have sought to facilitate timely reporting by 
providers of changes to their network par-
ticipation and other practice data. Consumer 
groups and providers have suggested other 
proactive efforts that insurers should take 
to promote the reliability of directories, in-
cluding establishing a process for the public 
to report inaccuracies, conducting periodic 
audits of a sample of their provider lists, and 
contacting providers who have not submit-
ted claims for a period of time. These provi-
sions were all included in legislation recently 
enacted in Georgia. The new Georgia statute 
also contains a protection, supported by con-
sumer groups, under which enrollees might 
be shielded from out-of-network cost sharing 
if they received out-of-network care after rely-
ing on materially inaccurate information in 
the insurer’s provider directory. 
A model law?
In response to the proliferation of managed 
care plans in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners (NAIC) developed a model law for 
states to use as a foundation when consider-
ing legislation to regulate network adequacy. 
Adopted in 1996, the Managed Care Plan 
Network Adequacy Model Act (now known as 
the Health Benefit Plan Network Access and 
Adequacy Model Act) endorsed a qualitative 
standard for judging network sufficiency that 
resembles those used by many states and that 
served as a template for the current federal 
network adequacy regulation for qualified 
health plans.
As network issues have gained renewed 
prominence, the NAIC determined to mod-
ernize the model law. After more than a year 
of discussions among regulators and with 
extensive input from a range of stakeholders 
and consumer groups, the NAIC unanimously 
adopted a substantially revised version of the 
model in late 2015. 
The new model act contains numerous pro-
visions, as well as “drafting notes” that provide 
states guidance and options for determining 
the regulatory course that suits their needs. 
Among its key components, the model law:
• Continues to define network adequacy 
qualitatively. However, the act makes explicit 
that state insurance departments, and not the 
health plan itself, must determine whether the 
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plan’s network is sufficient. Drafting notes 
also suggest that states might consider estab-
lishing quantitative standards for adequacy, 
either through law or by regulation. 
• Requires plans to provide regulators with 
additional details about their networks. This 
includes the factors used to build each net-
work and the efforts made by the plan to ad-
dress the needs of enrollees—including but 
not limited to children and adults; those with 
limited English proficiency or illiteracy; those 
with diverse cultural or ethnic backgrounds; 
and those with physical or mental disabili-
ties and serious, chronic, or complex medical 
conditions. 
• Sets new standards for provider directo-
ries. Provider lists must be updated monthly 
and contain descriptive information includ-
ing consumer-friendly language explaining 
how providers were selected and, if applica-
ble, the criteria the plan used to tier providers 
and the tier of each provider. The model act 
also requires insurers to periodically audit 
their directories and provide the public with 
a mechanism for reporting inaccuracies.
what’s next?
All indications suggest plans with limited net-
works will persist on and off of the ACA’s Mar-
ketplaces, and with them, debate over their 
value and risks. Likewise, policy makers and 
regulators likely will continue to devote atten-
tion to determining whether current network 
adequacy rules meet the needs of consumers 
and stakeholders and, if not, how they should 
be modified.
Since the launch of the Marketplaces in 
2014, more than a dozen states have chosen to 
act. Most made modest revisions to existing 
regulatory frameworks; some departed signif-
icantly from their old approaches—to bolster 
regulators’ oversight and rulemaking author-
ity (for example, Oregon) or to add substantial 
new quantitative requirements (for example, 
Washington State) or directory standards (for 
example, Georgia and Maryland). 
With the approval, in November 2015, of its 
network adequacy model act, the NAIC com-
mitted to prioritize adoption of the model by 
a majority of states within three years. By mid-
2016 few state legislatures had introduced, let 
alone advanced, a bill based on the model. 
The pace of legislative action might accelerate 
next year, with more time having elapsed to 
digest Marketplace developments—and the 
model law itself. For the NAIC’s goal of rapid 
and widespread adoption to be realized, it will 
need to.
Should state interest in the model act instead 
remain limited, the likelihood that federal 
regulators take their own steps to strengthen 
network requirements for Marketplace plans 
will increase. Federal officials already use 
quantitative standards to evaluate the net-
works of Medicare Advantage plans and have 
issued regulations requiring numeric mea-
sures for the Medicaid managed care market 
beginning in 2018. The primary explanation 
given by CMS for declining to finalize its pro-
posal requiring quantitative standards for 
qualified health plans was that, with passage 
of the model act, states should have time to 
adopt its provisions. If most states ultimately 
decline to implement the model, the focus will 
shift to CMS to revisit, as it has promised, this 
thorny issue. n
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